Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle

Ruvin Gekker

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3

Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle

Ruvin Gekker

University of California, Irvine

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer) › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

It is shown that a social choice function satisfying certain expansion-consistency conditions but without the weak Pareto principle generates somewhat asymmetric power structure, e.g., veto- quasi-dictatorship.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	73-80
Number of pages	8
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	15
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3
Publication status	Published - Feb 1988
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Consistency
social choice function
veto

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10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3

Cite this

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title = "Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle",

abstract = "It is shown that a social choice function satisfying certain expansion-consistency conditions but without the weak Pareto principle generates somewhat asymmetric power structure, e.g., veto- quasi-dictatorship.",

keywords = "Consistency, social choice function, veto",

author = "Ruvin Gekker",

year = "1988",

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doi = "10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3",

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PY - 1988/2

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AB - It is shown that a social choice function satisfying certain expansion-consistency conditions but without the weak Pareto principle generates somewhat asymmetric power structure, e.g., veto- quasi-dictatorship.

KW - Consistency

KW - social choice function

KW - veto

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/45549117205

U2 - 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3

DO - 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-4896

VL - 15

SP - 73

EP - 80

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 1

ER -

Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle

Abstract

Keywords

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