TY - JOUR
T1 - Sustaining quality in tourism destinations
T2 - An economic model with an application
AU - Keane, Michael J.
PY - 1996/12
Y1 - 1996/12
N2 - Sustaining quality in tourism destinations can be described as seeking to maintain a destination's reputation. This is a strategy that has a dynamic dimension in the sense that the benefits from such a strategy are likely to accrue in the future. The task of building reputation will necessitate some investment which implies that, in equilibrium, a high quality tourism experience will sell for a premium above its cost of production. This premium can be seen as the return on the initial investment in reputation, or as an important incentive in inducing a destination to maintain its reputation as a particular kind of quality destination. Without such a premium a destination may find that a fly-by-night strategy of quality reduction would be profit maximizing. This is the type of moral hazard problem that is present when, say, a tourism destination faces the question of how to react to increases in tourist numbers. With large numbers reputation may not be seen as important and the various providers have a strong incentive to cut quality, as long as it is costly to produce quality, to the lowest level. If there is a premium provided to maintain quality this problem can, however, be overcome and quality can be sustained. This problem is modelled and illustrated for tourism to a small island off the west coast of Ireland.
AB - Sustaining quality in tourism destinations can be described as seeking to maintain a destination's reputation. This is a strategy that has a dynamic dimension in the sense that the benefits from such a strategy are likely to accrue in the future. The task of building reputation will necessitate some investment which implies that, in equilibrium, a high quality tourism experience will sell for a premium above its cost of production. This premium can be seen as the return on the initial investment in reputation, or as an important incentive in inducing a destination to maintain its reputation as a particular kind of quality destination. Without such a premium a destination may find that a fly-by-night strategy of quality reduction would be profit maximizing. This is the type of moral hazard problem that is present when, say, a tourism destination faces the question of how to react to increases in tourist numbers. With large numbers reputation may not be seen as important and the various providers have a strong incentive to cut quality, as long as it is costly to produce quality, to the lowest level. If there is a premium provided to maintain quality this problem can, however, be overcome and quality can be sustained. This problem is modelled and illustrated for tourism to a small island off the west coast of Ireland.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0030318907
U2 - 10.1080/000368496327525
DO - 10.1080/000368496327525
M3 - Article
SN - 0003-6846
VL - 28
SP - 1545
EP - 1553
JO - Applied Economics
JF - Applied Economics
IS - 12
ER -