Simulation of an optional strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma in spatial and non-spatial environments

Research output: Chapter in Book or Conference Publication/ProceedingConference Publicationpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents research comparing the effects of different environments on the outcome of an extended Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which agents have the option to abstain from playing the game. We consider three different pure strategies: Cooperation, defection and abstinence. We adopt an evolutionary game theoretic approach and consider two different environments: the first which imposes no spatial constraints and the second in which agents are placed on a lattice grid. We analyse the performance of the three strategies as we vary the loner’s payoff in both structured and unstructured environments. Furthermore we also present the results of simulations which identify scenarios in which cooperative clusters of agents emerge and persist in both environments.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFrom Animals to Animats - 14th International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, SAB 2016, Proceedings
EditorsJohn Hallam, Elio Tuci, Alexandros Giagkos, Myra Wilson
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages145-156
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9783319434872
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event14th International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, SAB 2016 - Aberystwyth, United Kingdom
Duration: 23 Aug 201626 Aug 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9825 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference14th International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, SAB 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityAberystwyth
Period23/08/1626/08/16

Keywords

  • Artificial life
  • Evolutionary computation
  • Game theory

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