Sen cycles and externalities

Ashley Piggins; Gillian Salerno

doi:10.13025/27668

Sen cycles and externalities

Ashley Piggins
, Gillian Salerno

Economics

National University of Ireland

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer) › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Sen's (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal depends on the presence of externalities. Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any Sen cycle, every decisive individual suffers at least one strong negative externality. We show that this result only holds when individual preferences are strict. We prove a general theorem for the case of weak preferences.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	25-27
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	149
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.13025/27668 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.007
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2016

Keywords

Externalities
Liberal paradox
Saari–Petron theorem
Sen's impossibility theorem
Social preference cycles

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10.13025/27668Licence: CC BY-NC-ND
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.007

Cite this

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title = "Sen cycles and externalities",

abstract = "Sen's (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal depends on the presence of externalities. Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any Sen cycle, every decisive individual suffers at least one strong negative externality. We show that this result only holds when individual preferences are strict. We prove a general theorem for the case of weak preferences.",

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AB - Sen's (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal depends on the presence of externalities. Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any Sen cycle, every decisive individual suffers at least one strong negative externality. We show that this result only holds when individual preferences are strict. We prove a general theorem for the case of weak preferences.

KW - Externalities

KW - Liberal paradox

KW - Saari–Petron theorem

KW - Sen's impossibility theorem

KW - Social preference cycles

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10379/13477

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84993940080

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M3 - Article

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VL - 149

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Sen cycles and externalities

Abstract

Keywords

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