Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Conal Duddy

doi:10.13025/25434

Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Conal Duddy

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer) › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.

Original language	English (Ireland)
Journal	Synthese
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.13025/25434 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4
Publication status	Published - 27 Jun 2013
Externally published	Yes

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10.13025/25434Licence: CC BY-NC-ND
10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4

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title = "Reconciling probability theory and coherentism",

abstract = "Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.",

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year = "2013",

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AB - Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.

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JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

ER -

Reconciling probability theory and coherentism

Abstract

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