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Pareto efficiency with spatial rights

  • University of Murcia
  • Queen's University of Belfast

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer)Articlepeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the problem of constructing a Pareto-efficient social welfare function that respects individual rights when preferences are defined over the location of a public facility. Restricting individual preferences to be either single-peaked or single-dipped, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Pareto-efficient social welfare function that respects individual rights.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)265-283
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2005

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
    SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

  • Domain restriction
  • Sen's theorem
  • Spatial rights

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