Nietzsche, value and objectivity

This paper examines the status of value judgements in Nietzsches philosophy. It argues that although Nietzsche often adopts the subjectivist position that human values are projections onto the world this conclusion does not follow from his other philosophical commitments. Rather, value non-objectivism follows only if we take correspondence or verisimilitude as our standard of objectivity. However, Nietzsches perspectivism points to an alternative account of value. In order to demonstrate this, the paper examines two contrasting arguments in his writings regarding the status of human values. The first, articulated in Human, All Too Human, adopts a non-objectivist account of value. This account further supports the subjectivist reading by treating objectivity and perspectivity as mutually exclusive. However, Nietzsches articulation of the subjectivist account in Human, All Too Human gives rise to a particular existential dilemma, the alleviation of which demands a second, alternative account, that offers a significant reconsideration of the status of our value judgements. This second account, which is reconstructed using the conceptual resources available throughout Nietzsches writings, entails a re-examination of what constitutes objectivity. It reveals that objectivity must after all include perspectivity, which far from divorcing us from objects, marks the seal of our unavoidable engagement with them.