de Finetti's theory of probability and its Jaynesian critique

  • K. Vela Velupillai

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer)Articlepeer-review

Abstract

Abstract For aesthetic, strategic and pragmatic reasons, Jaynes (Probability: The Logic of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, Appendix A) objects to Bruno de Finetti's founding of probability theory on the basis of the notion of coherence. In this paper an attempt is made to diffuse this critique, as well as to point out, briefly, that these, and the remarks on a variety of foundational issues in mathematics and metamathematics (op.cit, Appendix B) are misguided.

Original languageEnglish
Article number5
Pages (from-to)85-95
Number of pages11
JournalEconomia Politica
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Apr 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Aesthetics
  • Betting
  • Coherence
  • Robot
  • Turing machine

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