Collective approval

Conal Duddy; Ashley Piggins

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004

Collective approval

Conal Duddy
, Ashley Piggins

National University of Ireland

Research output: Contribution to a Journal (Peer & Non Peer) › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	190-194
Number of pages	5
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	65
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004
Publication status	Published - May 2013
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004

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title = "Collective approval",

abstract = "We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.",

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N2 - We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.

AB - We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84875268525

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004

M3 - Article

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VL - 65

SP - 190

EP - 194

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 3

ER -

Collective approval

Abstract

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