Analysis of generalised tit-for-tat strategies in evolutionary spatial N-player prisoner dilemmas

Menglin Li, Colm O'Riordan

Research output: Chapter in Book or Conference Publication/ProceedingConference Publicationpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This work explores the evolution of a population of generalised tit-for-tat (TFT) strategies playing an N-player prisoner's dilemma on a regular lattice. We show that the generalised TFT can be robust to invasion by defectors in most cases. However, interestingly, the TFT strategies which are highly tolerant perform worse than totally cooperative strategies. Furthermore, although, the TFT strategies can-not guarantee the promotion of cooperation, the less tolerant TFT strategies obtain a stable and higher level of cooperation against defectors and populations containing both defectors and cooperators.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGECCO 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference Companion
Pages59-60
Number of pages2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event15th Annual Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation, GECCO 2013 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: 6 Jul 201310 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameGECCO 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference Companion

Conference

Conference15th Annual Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation, GECCO 2013
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period6/07/1310/07/13

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Evolutionary games
  • N-player prisoner's dilemma
  • Spatial topology

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